Surrogate Health Care Decision Making: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Recognizes the Right of an Individual in a Permanent Vegetative State to Refuse Life-Sustaining Measures through a Surrogate Decision Maker by Nooning, Christine H.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 35 Number 3 Article 5 
1997 
Surrogate Health Care Decision Making: The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Recognizes the Right of an Individual in a 
Permanent Vegetative State to Refuse Life-Sustaining Measures 
through a Surrogate Decision Maker 
Christine H. Nooning 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christine H. Nooning, Surrogate Health Care Decision Making: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
Recognizes the Right of an Individual in a Permanent Vegetative State to Refuse Life-Sustaining Measures 
through a Surrogate Decision Maker, 35 Duq. L. Rev. 849 (1997). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol35/iss3/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Comments
Surrogate Health Care Decision Making: The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Recognizes the
Right of an Individual in a Permanent Vegetative
State to Refuse Life-Sustaining Measures
Through a Surrogate Decision Maker
"[Ojur holding today applies only to situations where the individual in
question was once a competent adult, but is now in a permanent vege-
tative state, and while competent that individual left no advance direc-
tives pertaining to life sustaining measures."l
With these words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended
the right to refuse medical treatment to a patient in a permanent
vegetative state ("PVS") by allowing a close family member to
exercise the right on behalf of the patient.2 The case in which the
court extended this right is In re Fiori,3 and the facts of the case
are as follows.
In 1976, at the age of twenty-four, Daniel Joseph Fiori ("Fiori")
suffered two successive head injuries and never regained con-
sciousness.4 Fiori's physicians subsequently diagnosed him as
being in a "persistent vegetative state,"5 and, consequently,
1. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 913 (Pa. 1996).
2. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 912.
3. Id. at 905.
4. Id. at 908.
5. Id. A "persistent" vegetative state "is characterized by the loss of all higher
brain functions, including awareness, feelings, and the capacity to suffer." Marcia Angell,
After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 N. ENGL. J. MED.
1524, 1524 (1994). A patient in a "persistent" vegetative state is able to survive for many
years with the aid of artificial feeding, and if needed, heart and lung support. Id. On the
other hand, a "permanent" vegetative state is a "persistent" vegetative state that has
become irreversible. Id.
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Fiori's medications, fluids and nutrition were provided to him
through a gastrostomy tube.' Sixteen years later, in 1992, Fiori's
mother, acting as his guardian, requested the nursing home to
remove Fiori's gastrostomy tube.7 When the nursing home
refused, Fiori's mother petitioned the court for an order directing
the nursing home to discontinue Fiori's treatment.'
The trial court granted Fiori's mother's motion on the basis
that discontinuing Fiori's life support treatment would be in his
best interest.9 The Attorney General appealed the decision to the
superior court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.1' Fiori
later died before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allow-
The term "vegetative state" describes "a body which is functioning entirely in
terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature... heartbeat... pulmonary
ventilation ... [and] digestive activity." Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908 n.1 (citing Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,267 n.1 (1990), quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d
434, 438 (N.J. 1987)). Although the body "maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves
for low level conditioned responses . . . there is no behavioral evidence of either self-
awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner." Id. (citing Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 267 n.1, quoting Jobes, 529 A.2d at 438). A vegetative state, then, is a "twi-
light zone of suspended animation where death commences while life, in some form, con-
tinues." Id. (quoting Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987)).
At the time Fiori was diagnosed, the term "permanent" vegetative state had not
yet been developed. Id. n. 1. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged, however,
that because "Fiori... had been in a vegetative state for approximately nineteen years
prior to his death, [he] would probably now be diagnosed as having been in a permanent
vegetative state." Id.
6. Fori, 673 A.2d at 908. A gastrostomy tube is a tube surgically inserted into
the stomach through which a patient receives medications, fluids and nutrition. Id.
7. Id. The court appointed Fiori's mother as his guardian. Id.
8. Id. at 908-09. The nursing home did not oppose Fiori's mother's request, but
simply wanted court approval. Id. at 909 n.3.
9. Id. Two neurologists testified at the hearing on the petition. Id. One neurolo-
gist was retained by Fiori's mother and the other was appointed by the judge at the
request of the Attorney General to examine Fiori. Id. Both neurologists testified that
Fiori would remain in a permanent vegetative state and with the help of modern technol-
ogy, possibly live another ten to twenty years. Id. Fiori's mother admitted that Fiori
never told her whether he would want life-sustaining treatment discontinued if he was in
a permanent vegetative state. Id. Fiori's mother believed, however, that Fiori would
want the treatment discontinued. Id. The trial court found that because it had insuffi-
cient evidence, it could not determine whether Fiori would want the treatment discontin-
ued. In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), affd, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
Therefore, the trial court applied an objective test and determined that the discontinu-
ance of life-sustaining treatment would be in Fiori's best interests. Id.
10. Fori, 673 A.2d at 909. On appeal, the Attorney General challenged the stan-
dard used by the trial court. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1352. The Attorney General argued that
the appropriate standard is not whether discontinuing the life-sustaining treatment
would be in Fiori's best interests, but whether there is clear and convincing evidence that
discontinuing the treatment would be Fiori's choice if he was competent. Id. The supe-
rior court rejected the clear and convincing standard because it would be too difficult to
meet:
If, for example, we were to apply the clear and convincing evidence test to a case
like the instant one, it would be impossible for a court to approve the termination
of life sustaining treatment to Mr. Fiori, even if those closest to him were convinced
that is what he would want. Unless they could produce a written statement, or
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ance of the Attorney General's second appeal of the case.11 The
supreme court nevertheless heard the appeal, recognizing that
although the case was moot due to Fiori's death, it raised an
important issue that was capable of repetition but able to avoid
review."'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made three determinations
in Fiori.11 First, the court found that the right of a person to self-
determine 4 whether to refuse medical treatment does not termi-
nate when the individual becomes incapacitated. 15 Second, the
court held that a close family member may exercise the right of
self-determination on behalf of a PVS patient and refuse or ter-
minate the patient's life-sustaining treatment without court
intervention as long as the close family member, two physicians
qualified to evaluate the patient's condition and other interested
parties agree with the decision.16 Third, the court established
the "substituted judgment" approach as the standard to be fol-
lowed by a close family member when deciding on behalf of a
PVS patient whether to accept, refuse or terminate the patient's
life-sustaining treatment.
17
testify to an oral one in which Mr. Fiori had said, This is what I want," nothing
could be done.
Id. at 1356.
The superior court also rejected the clear and convincing standard because the
difficulty in satisfying it would likely negate the interest the standard is supposed to
protect. Id. Finally, the court determined that the court intervention necessary to
ensure that clear and convincing evidence existed would compound the suffering of the
patient's family. Id. at 1356-57. The court determined, therefore, that Fiori's mother
could substitute her judgment on Fiori's behalf. Id. at 1357.
11. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909.
12. Id. at 909 n.4.
13. Id. at 910, 912-13.
14. The right of self-determination was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court over one hundred years ago as "the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law." Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909-10 (quoting Union Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
15. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 (citing In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983); Mack v.
Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1992); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nor.,
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
16. Id. at 912-13. The Fiori court defined interested parties as including "close
family members, the guardian of the incompetent, attending physicians, or the care facil-
ity in which the patient is located." Id. at 913 n.13.
17. Id. at 912. Under the substituted judgment approach, the close family mem-
ber makes the decision for the PVS patient by substituting his or her judgment for that of
the patient. Id. at 911. See infra notes 67-69.
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I. THE INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL: THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based the right to self-deter-
mine whether to accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining
measures on the common law doctrine of informed consent.'8 A
survey of thirteen states 9 illustrates that the courts in at least
nine other states have also found this right to be grounded in the
common law doctrine.2" Moreover, nine of the surveyed states'
courts have found this right to be protected by the federal consti-
tutional right to privacy,2' and five of the states' courts have
18. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909. The supreme court noted that the "right to refuse medi-
cal treatment has deep roots in our common law. More than a century ago, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that '[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person.... .'" Id. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)). The doctrine of informed consent evolved from the right to possess and
control one's own body. Id. at 910. See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (finding that "[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages"). Naturally resulting from the doctrine of informed consent is the right "to refuse
treatment and to withdraw consent to treatment once begun." Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910
(quoting Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (Md. 1992)). Accord Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (concluding that a "logical corollary of the doc-
trine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent,
that is, to refuse treatment"). Furthermore, the right of self-determination is a long-
established right that does not depend on the exercise of the right while the person is
competent for its existence. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 74 (Wis. 1992).
The right of self-determination, then, does not cease when a person becomes incapaci-
tated. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910.
19. The states surveyed are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Washington.
20. States that have based the right to privacy on the common law doctrine of
informed consent include Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York and Washington. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987); Foody v. Manchester Mer. Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989); In re Guardi-
anship of Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987); Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,
416-18 (Mo. 1988), affd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In
re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983).
21. Various guarantees of certain Amendments to the United States Constitution
create a "zone of privacy" protected from governmental intrusion. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). Included in this zone of privacy is the right of
association under the First Amendment. Id. The right of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures protects the sanctity of
one's home from governmental invasion. Id. Moreover, the Griswold Court found addi-
tional protection under the Third Amendment's prohibition against the forced quartering
of troops in one's home in times of peace, under the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination and under the Ninth Amendment's provision that the enumer-
ation of certain rights in the United States Constitution does not destroy or make inferior
other rights that citizens possess. Id.
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found this right to be protected by a state constitutional right to
privacy." In addition, the majority of the states surveyed have
found the right to be based on a combination of these grounds.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Fiori properly found the
right of self-determination to be rooted in the common law24 and
not in a constitutional right to privacy.25 First, the court cor-
rectly followed the recognized principle that a court should avoid
a constitutional issue if its decision can be based on different
grounds.26 Second, a finding that the right of self-determination
The states determining that the personal rights guaranteed by the federal right
to privacy encompass the right to refuse medical treatment include Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington. See
Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-83 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 482
A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Severns, 425 A.2d. 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ohio 1980); In re Coyler, 660
P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983).
22. The states that have found the right to privacy to exist under their respective
state constitutions include Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey and Washington. See
Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior
Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368,
370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.), cert. denied sub
nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43
(Wash. 1983).
The courts in at least two of these states have found express privacy provisions to
be contained in their constitutions. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,
682 (Ariz. 1987) and In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983). The privacy provi-
sions in both state constitutions are identical and provide: "No person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs ... without authority of law." ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
23. The states that have based the right of self-determination on a combination of
the federal right to privacy (federal), the state right to privacy (state) or the common law
doctrine of informed consent (common law) include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Washington. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Flem-
ing, 741 P.2d 674, 681-83 (Ariz. 1987) (federal, state and common law); Bouvia v. Superior
Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (federal and state); Foody v. Manchester
Mem. Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (federal and common law); Cor-
bett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (federal and state);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977)
(federal and common law); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,663 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Garger v. New Jersey, 492 U.S. 922 (1976) (federal and state); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404,
410 (N.J. 1987) (common law); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983) (federal,
state and common law).
24. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909.
25. In Fiori, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court completely avoided the constitu-
tional issue of whether the right to privacy includes the right to self-determine whether to
accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining measures. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909 ("[Wle
choose to ... rely solely on the common-law basis for the right to self-determination, and
have eschewed an analysis based upon constitutional principles.").
26. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909 (reasoning that the court should "adhere to the
sound tenet of jurisprudence that courts should avoid constitutional issues when the
Duquesne Law Review
is based on the common law alone is sufficient. A finding by the
court that either the federal or state constitutional right to pri-
vacy encompasses the right of self-determination would only
serve to further complicate this important issue. Prior and
future case law regarding the right to privacy would then become
relevant and bear on the issues involved in the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, and the Pennsylvania courts would
thus be required to take cognizance of such case law before mak-
ing determinations.
Third, the Fiori court correctly avoided the federal constitu-
tional arena because the case law regarding the federal right to
privacy vis a vis the right to self-determine whether to accept,
refuse or terminate life-sustaining treatment is not clear. The
United States Supreme Court has never determined that the
right to privacy includes the right to accept, refuse or terminate
life-sustaining measures.27 The right to privacy, according to the
United States Supreme Court, includes "only personal rights
that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."2  The Supreme Court has limited these per-
sonal rights to important decisions in "matters relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education."29 Thus, unless and until the United
States Supreme Court recognizes the right to privacy to encom-
pass the right to self-determine whether to accept, refuse or ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment, no such right is indelible, and
a finding by a state court that such a federal constitutional right
exists is subject to the Supreme Court's approval or rejection.30
issue at hand may be decided on other grounds") (citing Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947)).
27. The United States Supreme Court has clearly recognized a constitutional right
to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (determining that although the
federal Constitution does not specifically mention the right to privacy, the Court, "[in a
line of decisions.., going back perhaps as far as Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891) . .. has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution"). The Court, how-
ever, has never held that the right to privacy includes the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990)
(noting that '[although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right to privacy, we have never so held").
28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
29. Id.; Whalen v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 869, 877 n.26 (1977).
30. The question of whether a federal right exists under the United States Consti-
tution is not finally resolved until the United States Supreme Court addresses the issue
under its appellate jurisdiction authorized under Article III of the United States Consti-
tution. Under Article III, the United States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in
"all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-2. The fact that it is a state court that finds
a federal right to exist is of no consequence to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
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Moreover, it may be that a different provision of the federal
constitution protects this right. Although the United States
Supreme Court has never held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment 31 protects the right to make a per-
sonal decision to accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment, this theory can be inferred from the Court's decision in
Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health. 2
Subsequent to Cruzan, the line between the right to privacy
and the liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause
was blurred by the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood of Southwest Pennsylvania v. Casey,33 when, in dis-
cussing the scope of the liberty interest, the Court said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education .... These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the state.
34
See Cohen v. Virginia 5. L.Ed. 257, 416 (1821) (determining that the United States
Supreme Court has authority to review decisions in cases arising under the federal con-
stitution no matter what court decides the issue). In fact, the ability of the states to
determine issues of federal law depends on the Supreme Court's authority to review all
decisions involving issues of federal law. See id. (concluding that unless the United
States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions that involve
questions of federal law, "the local Courts must be excluded from a concurrent jurisdic-
tion" in those matters.) Thus, a determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that
the federal right to privacy encompasses the right can be no more than a state court's
interpretation of the federal constitution, which can be overturned by the United States
Supreme Court on appeal.
31. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
32. 477 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court noted that the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment "is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest." Id. at 279 n.7. Furthermore, the Court implied that past decisions by the
Court have established the protection. See id. at 278 (stating that "the principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our past decisions"). Finally, in recognizing the
right of Missouri to protect the "personal element" of the decision to terminate life-sus-
taining treatment, the Court in Cruzan determined that the interests protected by the
Due Process Clause include the patient's interest in making a decision regarding life-
sustaining treatment and the state's interest in protecting the patient's life. See id. at
281 ("It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well
as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.").
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Planned Parenthood of S.W. Pa., 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added).
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Additionally, the issue of whether the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the right to privacy has now emerged. Interestingly, the
United States Supreme Court will soon decide whether the lib-
erty interest of the Due Process Clause protects the right to pri-
vacy, as the reasoning of Casey has been used by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals to support the position that a terminally
ill patient's right to self-determination should include the right
to hasten one's own death. 5
In March of 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the right to refuse medical treatment is a
liberty interest that includes the right to hasten one's own death,
thus expanding the boundaries of the Due Process Clause.36 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that a-"common thread" running through
the important decisions relating to marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships, and child rearing and education
is "that they involve decisions that are highly personal and inti-
mate, as well as of great importance to the individual."37 Conse-
quently, "[1]ike the decision of whether or not to have an
abortion, the decision of how and when to die is one of 'the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a
choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.'" 38  If the
United States Supreme Court in an upcoming decision agrees
with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the right of persons in Penn-
35. Compassion in Dying v. Washington 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996). Oral arguments on both of these cases was
heard on January 8, 1997. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Vacco v.
Quill (No. 95-1858). The issue in both cases is whether a physician may prescribe drugs
to hasten a patient's death. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 794; Quill, 80 F.3d at 719.
The state statutes in both cases criminalized the aiding or assisting in another's suicide
and were challenged as unconstitutional as applied to physicians. Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 794; Quill, 80 F.3d at 719.
36. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816. The Ninth Circuit held that "the 'or aids'
provision of the Washington statute .... as applied to the prescription of life-ending medi-
cation for use by terminally ill, competent adult patients who wish to hasten their deaths,
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 798.
In April of 1996, the Second Circuit found no such liberty right. Quill, 80 F.2d at
727. Instead, according to the Second Circuit, the Equal Protection Clause prevents the
state from interfering with the decision of a terminally-ill patient to hasten his or her own
death. Id. The Second Circuit found that the New York statute violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it did not equally treat those similarly situated:
[Tihose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are
allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those
who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining
equipment[,] are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering drugs.
Id. at 729.
37. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
38. Id. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that "[pirohibiting a terminally ill
patient from hastening his death may have an even more profound impact on that per-
son's life than forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term." Id. at 814.
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sylvania to refuse life-sustaining treatment may be protected by
the United States Constitution under the liberty interest of the
Due Process Clause,3 9 or possibly under the right to privacy as
protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause.'
0
Finally, a finding by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the
right to self-determine whether to accept, refuse or terminate
life-sustaining treatment is based on the right to privacy under
the Pennsylvania Constitution would have been a departure
from prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions. Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously found a right to pri-
vacy to be encompassed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, 1 the
court adopted the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
that the right to privacy includes "only personal rights that can
be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" as announced in Roe v. Wade. 4 2 Consequently, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme Court,
would either have to expand the list of decisions promulgated
pursuant to the right to privacy to include "medical" decisions, or
find that important decisions relating to family relationships
include medical decisions and thus extend the right to privacy to
39. The United States Supreme Court, however, may not expand the liberty inter-
est grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment because it has been reluctant to do so in the
past. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not protect an individual's right to engage in homosexual sodomy in his own
home because homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right having recognizable roots
in the Constitution).
40. To find that the right to privacy, either standing alone or as protected by the
Due Process Clause, includes the right to self-determine whether to accept, refuse or ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment, the Court would first have to overcome the barrier that
prior decisions have limited the right to privacy to important decisions "relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education."
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. The Court would have to either find the right to privacy pro-
tects decisions made by close family members when acting as a health care surrogate on
behalf of an incompetent parent, child or sibling because such a decision would be an
important decision relating to family relationships, or add "medical" decisions (or some
variation thereof) to the list of decisions protected by the right to privacy. Moreover, the
Court would have to reason that the right to self-determine whether to accept, refuse or
terminate life-sustaining treatment is a "fundamental right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" as required by Roe. See id.
41. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously found protection for the right to
privacy in Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In re Petition of Lanni,
415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980). Art. I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as
follows:
§ 1. Inherent rights of mankind.
All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possession and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.
PA. CONST. art. I., § 1.
42. See McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 639 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa.
1980) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
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family members when acting as surrogate health care decision
makers.
II. BALANCING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE OR TERMINATE
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF
THE STATE
In recognizing the right of an individual to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fol-
lowed the general principle that the right is not absolute and
may be limited by four commonly recognized state interests: pro-
tecting innocent third parties, preventing suicide, guarding the
integrity of the medical profession and preserving life.4 3 The
court proceeded to discuss these four state interests in the con-
text of Fiori's case.
The first state interest, protecting innocent third parties,
focuses upon the emotional and financial impact a PVS patient's
death would have on the patient's dependents."' Since Fiori did
not have any dependents, the supreme court found this state
interest not at risk in Fiori's case.45 In contrast to the decision in
Fiori, however, other states have recognized situations where
the state's interest in protecting third parties outweighed a
patient's right to refuse treatment. 46 The courts in these states
have disregarded the right to refuse treatment and forced compe-
tent adults to accept medical treatment where the patient's right
to refuse medical treatment would harm the health, safety or
security of others.
47
43. Fiori, 673 at 910. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683
(Ariz. 1987) (concluding that regardless of whether the right to refuse medical treatment
"emanat[es] from constitutional penumbras or premised on common law doctrine, the
right... is not absolute"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (finding that
'[clourts and commentators have commonly identified four state interests that may limit
a person's right to refuse medical treatment: preserving life, preventing suicide, safe-
guarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent parties").
44. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910.
45. Id.
46. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (citing Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Comm'r of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (Mass.
1979); Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill.
1972)).
47. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (recognizing the enforceabil-
ity of compulsory smallpox vaccination law to protect the public health); Comm'r of Cor-
rection v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (Mass. 1979) (requiring a prisoner to submit to
kidney dialysis rather than allowing prisoner to be transferred to a low security prison in
order to protect prison security); Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (compelling a mother to accept blood
transfusions against her religious beliefs in order to protect minor children from
abandonment).
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The Fiori court also did not consider the second state interest
of preventing suicide to be an issue. The court reasoned that in
Fiori's case, death would not be caused by a self-inflicted injury,
but instead result from a natural death process."s The superior
court noted that because Fiori was in a permanent vegetative
state, he would be incapable of suicide.49
Other courts have distinguished the right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment from the act of suicide by reasoning that
patients who exercise their right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment do not actually intend to die as does one who attempts sui-
cide.50 The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that "people
who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbor a
specific intent to die ... rather, they may fervently wish to live,
but to do so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery, or
drugs, and without protracted suffering."51 Thus, the difference
between the right to refuse medical treatment and suicide is that
the first involves self-determination, whereas the latter involves
self-destruction.52
The Fiori court further found that the third state interest of
guarding the integrity of the medical profession was not an issue
in that case.53 The court found that the Pennsylvania medical
community supports terminating a patient's life-sustaining
treatment when there is no chance for his or her recovery and the
decision is made by a surrogate trying to fulfill the patient's
wishes. 4 Interestingly, the American Medical Association has
also taken the position that providing life-sustaining treatment
to a patient is not always in the patient's best interests.55
48. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss how the natural death process would occur, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned
that the refusal to accept "medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natu-
ral course; if death were to eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the
underlying disease, and not the result of self-inflicted injury." Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224.
49. In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), affd, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa.
1996). The superior court defined suicide as "the volitional taking of one's own life." Id.
50. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224 (citing Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (Mass. 1977); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983)).
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910.
54. Id. (citing Brief of the Pennsylvania Medical Society to the Superior Court at
16).
55. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 684 & n.14. The Rasmussen court quoted the fol-
lowing statement issued on March 15, 1986 by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
of the American Medical Association:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering.
Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of the
patient, or his family, or legal representatives if the patient is incompetent to act in
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did, however, find the
fourth interest, the preservation of life, to be significant.56
According to the court, the state's interest in preserving life
involves two concerns: the protection of a patient's life and the
sanctity of all life. 7 The Fiori court noted that although both of
these concerns are strong, the right of a PVS patient, and partic-
ularly Fiori, to self-determine whether to accept, refuse or termi-
nate life-sustaining measures is stronger.5  The Fiori court
reasoned that "[t]he state's interest in maintaining the PVS indi-
vidual in an endless twilight state between life and death is so
weak that it cannot overcome the individual's right to self-deter-
mination." 9 Other courts have further reasoned that when the
administration of life-sustaining treatment serves only to post-
pone the death of a patient with an incurable affliction, and not
to improve the quality of life of a patient, the state's interest in
the preservation of life weakens and must give way to a patient's
right of self-determination.60
Throughout this balancing portion of its decision, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court utilized the "four-state-interest" analy-
sis developed by some of its sister states.6 Unlike the cases it
cited, however, the court applied the interest analysis in a
mechanical fashion. In less than the space of one page, the court
his own behalf, should prevail. In the absence of the patient's choice or an author-
ized proxy, the physician must act in the best interest of the patient.
• . . In deciding whether the administration of potentially life-prolonging
treatment is in the best interest of the patient who is incompetent to act [on] his
own behalf, the physician should determine what the possibility is for extending
life under humane and comfortable conditions and what are the prior expressed
wishes of the patient and attitudes of the family or those who have responsibility
for the custody of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irre-
versible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis
and with the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the
patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical
treatment.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition, or hydration. In treating a termi-
nally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether
the benefits of treatment outweigh its burden. At all times, the dignity of the
patient should be maintained.
Id. at 684 (emphasis omitted).
56. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 (citing Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683); accord Conroy, 486
A.2d at 1223.
57. Fori, 673 A.2d at 910 (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683).
60. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683; Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Garger v. New Jersey, 492 U.S. 922 (1976).
61. The court cited, among others, Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674
(Ariz. 1987) and In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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completed its analysis of all four interests.62 As a result, the
court devoted too little attention to these important issues and
failed to explain the purposes of the interests and the reasons
why the state's interests did not prevail.3 This portion of the
court's decision, therefore, affords little guidance for future situa-
tions where the right to self-determine whether to accept, refuse
or terminate life-sustaining measures must be balanced against
the four competing state interests. 64
III. ExERcISING THE RIGHT: THE THREE LEGAL STANDARDS
If no statute exists to guide a person in exercising the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of another, then the
decision maker must meet one of three judicially-created legal
standards developed to guide such surrogates.65 These stan-
dards are the "substituted judgment" standard, the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard and "best interests of the patient"
standard.66
Under the substituted judgment approach, an individual mak-
ing the decision on behalf of a patient to accept, refuse or termi-
nate medical treatment tries to make the same decision that the
patient would make if competent.67 In making the decision, the
surrogate first attempts to ascertain whether the patient
expressed a clear intent regarding life-sustaining treatment
62. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910. In fact, the court devoted less than sixty-five words
to the state's interest in protecting third parties, less than forty-two words to the state's
interest in preventing suicide, less than ninety-five words to the state's interest in pro-
tecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession and less than one hundred thirty-
five words to the state's interest in preserving life. See id. In contrast, the Arizona
Supreme Court in the case of Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz.
1987), devoted almost four pages to a very extensive and thoughtful analysis.
63. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910. For example, why did the court focus solely on
dependents who would be "financially and emotionally" bereft if the patient was to refuse
life-sustaining treatment when it analyzed the interests of innocent parties? See id. The
court did not say "financially or emotionally" bereft. What about spouses, parents, sib-
lings or children who are financially independent, but emotionally dependent on the
patient? Why did the court exclude them? Moreover, why is the "state's interest in main-
taining the PVS individual in an endless twilight state between life and death so weak
that it cannot overcome the individual's right to self-determination?" See id. The answer
may seem obvious. The state should not be able .to force someone to remain in a perma-
nent vegetative state against his or her will, but the court did not say as much or give any
other explanation.
64. Interested parties such as the surrogate, doctor, hospital and patient's immedi-
ate family would need to know their rights and obligations. Moreover, attorneys will be
called upon to aid clients in making decisions, and judges will be called upon to interpret
the court's finding.
65. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 911-12 & n.11.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 911.
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prior to becoming incompetent.68 If not, the surrogate uses the
patient's personal philosophy as a guide:
The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about and
reactions to medical issues, all the facts of the patient's personality
that the surrogate is familiar with - with, of course, particular refer-
ence to his or her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical val-
ues - in order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment the
patient would choose.
69
Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, a surrogate
must provide "'unequivocal proof of a patient's express wishes as
to the decision to terminate life support."70 As the New York
Court of Appeals explained, there must be proof that, prior to
becoming incompetent, the patient had firmly resolved that no
life-sustaining treatment be rendered:
[Tihe 'clear and convincing' evidence standard requires proof suffi-
cient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the cir-
cumstances like those presented. As a threshold matter, the trier of
fact must be convinced, as far as is humanly possible, that the
strength of the individual's beliefs and the durability of the individ-
ual's commitment to those beliefs.., makes a recent change of heart
unlikely. The persistence of the individual's statements, the serious-
ness with which those statements were made and the inferences, if
any, that may be drawn from the surrounding circumstances are
among the factors which should be considered. 7'
Thus, under this standard, a patient's right to life is so important
that only clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent not
to accept life-sustaining treatment sustains a waiver of that
right.72 The New York Court of Appeals is one court that has
68. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (N.J. 1989).
69. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 911 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987)).
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the surrogate should ascertain the decision
that the patient would have made based on the surrogate's intimate knowledge and
understanding of the patient:
[Elven if no prior specific statements were made, in the context of the individuals
entire prior mental life, including his or her philosophical, religious and moral
views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and
attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death, that individ-
ual's likely treatment/nontreatment preferences can be discovered.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987).
70. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 911.
71. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988). New York follows the clear
and convincing evidence standard. Id. Missouri also follows this standard. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990).
72. O'Connor, 521 N.E.2d at 614. Some rights are so important, i.e., the waiving of
constitutional rights, that only clear manifestations of the exercise or waiver of the right
will satisfy. Id. at 614 n.4. Furthermore, the fact finder must be convinced that the state-
ments made by the patient prior to incompetency "were more than immediate reactions to
unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged death."
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rejected the substituted judgment standard in favor of the clear
and convincing standard, noting that a person's right to life is so
important that "no person or court should substitute its judg-
ment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for
another."73
Under the third standard, the best interests standard, a surro-
gate uses objective criteria to determine whether the best inter-
ests of a patient would be protected by accepting, refusing or
terminating life-sustaining treatment:
Under the best interest standard[,] the surrogate decisionmaker
assesses what medical treatment would be in the patient's best inter-
ests as determined by such objective criteria as relief from suffering,
preservation or restoration of functioning, and quality and extent of
sustained life.... An accurate assessment will encompass considera-
tion of the satisfaction of present desires, the opportunities for future
satisfactions, and the possibility of developing or regaining the capac-
ity for self-determination.
74
The best interests approach is generally followed when proof of a
patient's wishes regarding the administration of life-sustaining
measures does not exist or the evidence regarding the patient's
wishes is unreliable.7" As the Arizona Supreme Court has rea-
soned, when there is insufficient evidence to determine a
patient's wishes, the most a surrogate can do is safeguard the
patient's best interests.76
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the substituted
judgment standard in Fiori because it believed that standard to
be "the only practical way to prevent the destruction of the PVS
patient's right to refuse medical treatment."77 Although the
court considered the clear and convincing evidence standard, it
Id. at 614. For example, comments by a patient that she "would never want to lose her
dignity before she passed away, that nature should be permitted to take its course, that it
is 'monstrous' to use life-support machinery - are, in fact, no different than those many
of us might make after witnessing an agonizing death." Id.
73. Id.
74. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) (citing PREsi-
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHIcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FoREGo LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 1, 135
(1983)) ("Commission Report"). The Rasmussen court noted that when using the term
"quality of life," the court was referring to "the value that the continuation of life has for
the patient" not "the value that others find in the continuation of the patient's life...."
Id. at 689 n.23 (quoting the Commission Report at 135, n.43).
75. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689. States that follow the best interests approach
include Arizona, Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (Ariz. 1987),
and California, Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
76. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689. The Rasmussen court additionally noted that the
substituted judgment standard "has been criticized for permitting past preferences to
govern subsequent treatment decisions even though a person's interests can change radi-
cally over time." Id. at 688 n.21.
77. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 912.
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found this standard unduly restrictive because it would under-
mine the PVS patient's right to self-determination. 78 The Fiori
court reasoned that unless a PVS patient clearly expressed the
desire not-to receive life-sustaining treatment prior to incompe-
tency, the patient would be forced to accept life-sustaining
treatment.79
The reasoning used by the Fiori court to reject the clear and
convincing evidence standard seems most persuasive. No person
wants a terminally ill loved one to be forced to accept hydration,
medication and nutrition. In adopting the substituted judgment
standard, however, the court caused the same type of problem
that it tried to prevent by rejecting the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard. The substituted judgment approach may also
undermine the patient's right to self-determination. By attempt-
ing to ascertain what the PVS patient would want, the surrogate
is doing no more than forming an opinion as to whether he or she
thinks the PVS patient would accept, refuse or terminate life-
sustaining treatment. More specifically, if the surrogate is una-
ware of the patient's prior decision as to the issue of life-sus-
taining treatment and is unable to determine from what he or
she knows about the patient's philosophy as to accepting the
treatment, then the surrogate is really subordinating the
patient's wishes to the surrogate's own judgment.
The court probably should not have just swept away the clear
and convincing evidence standard in Fiori because situations
will undoubtedly arise where a person who wishes to act as a
surrogate on behalf of the patient may not be a close family mem-
ber. Some patients may be estranged from their families or not
have families. Consequently, a friend or the patient's physician
may be called upon to make the decision regarding the adminis-
tration of life-sustaining treatment. In these situations, the pre-
sumption that the surrogate knows and understands the patient
and has the patient's best interests at heart should not be
made. 0 Rather, the decision regarding life-sustaining treatment
made by such a third party should be scrutinized to determine:
(1) whether the surrogate has a sufficient relationship with the
78. Id. at 911-12.
79. Id. at 912. The Fiori court reasoned that the patients "who did not have the
presence or the sophistication to express clearly and unmistakably their wishes on this
precise matter would not be able to have life support removed. For these individuals, the
choice concerning medical treatment would not be an extrapolation based upon their indi-
vidual beliefs." Id. Instead, "the 'choice' would be dependent simply upon how far the
frontiers of medical science had advanced: if the life sustaining procedures were avail-
able, they would be automatically administered. This we cannot tolerate." Id.
80. See infra notes 86-90 for the reasons (presumptions) why family members are
considered the best surrogates.
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patient; and (2) whether the surrogate has been able to ascertain
the patient's wishes so that the surrogate can give effect to such
wishes.
Since the potential for mistake is greater when a surrogate
decision maker is not a close family member, the standard of evi-
dence should be higher. The Fiori court should have at least rec-
ognized the realistic possibility that in future cases, the
surrogate may be a third party, and, therefore, the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard may be more appropriate in that situ-
ation. Even the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
that not all patients will have "loved ones" to act as surrogates,
and, consequently, the state "may legitimately seek to safeguard
the personal element of this choice through the impulsion of
heightened evidentiary requirements.""'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not adopt the best inter-
ests standard on the basis that it is too objective."2 Although the
court did not specifically mention why it chose the substituted
judgment approach over this standard, it can be inferred from
the cases previously cited that the substituted judgment
approach is generally preferred because it allows the surrogate
to effectuate the patient's own wishes. When the surrogate is
effectuating the patient's own wishes, then he or she is exercising
the right of self-determination on behalf of the patient. On the
other hand, making the decision under the best interest
approach requires the surrogate to base his or her decision on
less personal and more objective criteria, such as relief from suf-
fering. Such an approach is more of a safeguard of the patient's
interest than it is an exercise of the patient's right to self-
determination.
The substituted judgment approach, however, only works if
the patient had the capacity at one time to either express his or
her views or to develop a personal philosophy about life. If not,
the surrogate cannot possibly effectuate that which never
existed. To its credit, the Fiori court did not entirely reject the
best interests approach. Instead, the court recognized "that
there will be situations where there is simply no basis to effectu-
ate a substituted judgment."83 Thus, the Fiori court at least left
open the issue of whether the best interests approach should be
followed in situations when the patient is an infant, or where the
patient has been incompetent from birth or early childhood due
81. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990).
82. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 912 n.11.
83. Id. The Fiori court noted that where the patient is an infant, the patient could
never have "developed a personal ethical code or view on life" from which a surrogate
could base his or her substituted judgment. Id.
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to a mental or physical disease that severely impairs the
patient's ability to reason and make rationale decisions. As the
Arizona Supreme Court reasoned, under these circumstances
"the most a surrogate can do is safeguard the patient's best
interests."
8 4
IV. THE PROCEDURE FOR MAKING THE DECISION TO ACCEPT,
REFUSE OR TERMINATE LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT ON
BEHALF OF A PATIENT IN A PERMANENT
VEGETATIVE STATE
The Fiori court held that a close family member may decide
whether to withdraw a PVS patient's life-sustaining treatment.8
Several other courts have also found family members to be the
best surrogates.8 6 According to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
the family's substituted judgment is preferred for several rea-
sons. First, a patient's family knows and understands him or her
best.87 Second, the patient's family is the most interested in his
or her well-being.88 Third, the patient's family has his or her
best interests at heart.89 Fourth, medical authorities and public
opinion support the conclusion that family members should be
the surrogate decision makers.90
84. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689.
85. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not list the fam-
ily members who could act as surrogates. Id. Moreover, the supreme court did not say
that the role of the surrogate was limited to close family members. The court simply held
that "a close family member is well suited to the role of substitute decision maker." Id. at
912.
86. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445-46 (N.J. 1987) (citing Barber v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021 (1983); Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 482 A.2d 713
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,
926 (Fla. 1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 n.4 (Minn. 1984); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1980); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983)).
87. Id. at 445. The Jobes court concluded that "[ailmost invariably the patient's
family has an intimate understanding of the patient's medical attitudes and general
world view and therefore is in the best position to know the motives and considerations
that would control the patient's medical decisions." Id.
88. Id. According to the Jobes court, family members are best able "to make sub-
stituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of
the patient's approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with him or her." Id.
Family members are the ones who "are generally most concerned with the welfare of a
patient. It is they who.., treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause."
Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id. The Jobes court suggested that family members are the ones "who come to
the hospital and involve themselves in the sick person's care and comfort... [and] com-
monly act as advocates for patients in the hospital, looking out for their comfort, care and
best interests." Id.
90. Id. at 446-47. For example, a recent national survey revealed that 1,400 out of
2,000 participants "strongly agreed" that family members are the appropriate surrogates
to determine whether a patient's life-sustaining treatment should be continued. Id. at
447 n.11 (citing N.Y. Tmrxs, Dec. 2, 1986, at C10, Col 2-6).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was correct in following its
sister states by concluding that "close family members are well
suited to the role of substitute decision maker."91 If a close fam-
ily member is not well suited to the role, who is?
What should be questioned, however, is the court's lack of
attention to the issues inherent in the exercise of the right by a
close family member. Are not the motives of the surrogate mate-
rial? As one court noted, the possibility that greed may affect the
surrogate's decision or that the surrogate may otherwise profit
from the death of the patient is very real.2 Moreover, what
about the burden on the close family members to care for the
patient? These issues were not discussed by the Fiori court.
Instead, the court only addressed the question of whether the
court should intervene in the decision, holding that where all
parties, i.e., the physicians, close family member and interested
parties 93 are in agreement, no need for court approval exists.
4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not alone in deciding to
avoid judicial intervention in such decisions as the majority of
courts considering the issue of whether a surrogate's decision to
refuse or terminate a patient's life-sustaining treatment have
also rejected judicial intervention.9 5 For example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court found the decision process to take too long
when courts intervene. Many patients die before the court
makes a determination, and, consequently, the court prevents
the exercise of a right it is supposed to protect.
97
91. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913.
92. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300-01 (Ill. 1989).
93. Interested parties include close family members, guardian of the incompetent,
attending physicians and the facility caring for the patient. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913 n.13.
94. Fori, 673 A.2d at 913.
95. Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 300 (citing Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Flem-
ing, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ca. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981)).
96. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 449.
97. Id. The Jobes court found:
No matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex and sensitive area
may take too long. Thus, it could infringe the very rights that we want to protect.
The mere prospect of a cumbersome, intrusive and expensive court proceeding,
during such an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a patient and his or
her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many persons from deciding to discon-
tinue treatment. And even if the patient or the family were willing to submit to
such a proceeding, it is likely that the patient's rights would nevertheless be frus-
trated by judicial deliberation. Too many patients have died before their right to
reject treatment was vindicated in court.
Id.
Nevertheless, courts advocating nonintervention have recognized that a court may inter-
vene when disputes arise among interested parties. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913 (citing Ras-
mussen, 741 P.2d at 691); accord Jobes, 529 A.2d at 451.
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On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court advocated judi-
cial intervention for two reasons. First, the motives of the surro-
gate are critical in the decision regarding life-sustaining
treatment, and, thus, the intervention of a judge is proper before
life-sustaining treatment is halted due to the realistic possibility
that the surrogate's actions could be based upon improper
motives. 98
Second, the parens patriae99 power of the courts requires the
court to protect incompetent patients and their property.100 The
Attorney General in Fiori also argued for the court to exercise
this protective power. 10 ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, how-
ever, rejected this argument because it felt judicial intervention
violated the "essential and traditional respect for family.""0 2 Fur-
thermore, the court's intervention would be "yet another expan-
sion of the idea that courts... are the repository of wisdom and
98. See Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 300-01 (finding that judicial interven-
tion is required to "guard against the remote, yet real possibility that greed may taint the
judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker" and in situations where "the surrogate decision
maker stands to profit from the patient's demise and covets ill-gotten wealth to the point
of fatal attraction").
99. The term "parens patriae" literally translated means "parent of the country."
BLAcK's LAw DicTioNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Parens patriae refers to the states' tradi-
tional authority to protect those "who cannot take care of themselves," such as children.
Id. Stated another way, parens patriae protects those "who labor under any legal disabil-
ity." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New
Jersey, 492 U.S. 922 (1976). Thus, under its parens patriae power, the court has pro-
tected incompetent persons. Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 300.
100. Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 301. See Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (Mass. 1977) for an example of a court using
its protective jurisdiction to determine the best interests of an incompetent adult patient.
In Saikewicz, Mr. Saikewicz was determined to be incompetent because he was mentally
retarded. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430. Although Mr. Saikewicz had a limited ability to
understand and speak, he could not understand his situation. Id. Mr. Saikewicz devel-
oped leukemia and doctors subsequently recommended chemotherapy. Id. The court
appointed a guardian ad litem. Id. at 419. The guardian recommended not treating Mr.
Saikewicz because to do so would not be in his best interests, and the court held a hearing
on the guardian's report. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Saikewicz's two attending physicians
testified that Mr. Saikewicz would probably die without any discomfort if chemotherapy
was not administered. Id. at 420-21. If chemotherapy was administered, Mr. Saikewicz
would probably become very sick and possibly die from anemia. Id. at 420. The probate
court agreed and did not order the chemotherapy. Id. at 431. The probate judge recog-
nized that although most people would choose to undergo chemotherapy, and chemother-
apy would possibly extend Mr. Saikewicz's life, Mr. Saikewicz would not have chosen to
accept the treatment if he was competent because the evidence showed that Mr.
Saikewicz would not be able to understand the severe effects of the chemotherapy. Id. at
431-32.
101. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913 n.14. In Fori, the Attorney General argued that a
guardian ad litem should be appointed in cases like Fiori. Id.
102. Id. at 913.
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the only institution available to protect human life and
dignity."10 3
In rejecting judicial intervention, the court concluded that as
long as two qualified physicians prepare written statements cer-
tifying that the patient is in a permanent vegetative state and no
other interested party contests the surrogate's decision to accept,
refuse or terminate life-sustaining treatment, the court is not to
intervene. 10 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred, however,
in taking such a hands-off position.
First, the court is assuming that unless a dispute arises among
the interested parties, the surrogate is able to ascertain and
effectuate the patient's wishes. As noted previously, however,
the situation will undoubtedly arise in the future where the sur-
rogate seeking to make the decision regarding life-sustaining
treatment on behalf of a patient is not a close family member.
Where the surrogate is not a close family member, judicial inter-
vention is necessary to ensure that (1) a sufficient relationship
exists between the person seeking to be a surrogate and the
patient; and (2) that the person seeking to be a surrogate has
been able to ascertain the patient's wishes regarding life-sus-
taining treatment so as to give effect to them. Therefore, under
these situations, the court should exercise its parens patriae
power to protect the life of the incompetent patient.
Second, as noted earlier, the surrogate may be acting from
improper motives. Of course, if the surrogate with improper
motives makes the same decision that the patient would have
made, no harm is done. Harm will occur, however, when such a
surrogate makes a decision contrary to the patient's wishes.
Under these circumstances, the court has a duty to intervene. In
addition, the United States Supreme Court has strongly sug-
gested that where the family member is not acting to protect a
patient, the state, under the liberty interest of the Due Process
Clause, may protect the patient against such abuse.10 5
103. Id.
104. Id. at 912-13. The court further required that if the patient has an attending
physician, he or she must also prepare a written statement. Id. at 913. The concurring
opinion by Justice Zappala criticized the majority's requirement that at least two doctors
certify a PVS diagnosis. Id. at 914 (Zappala, J, concurring). Justice Zappala saw the
requirement merely as "reassurance" for the family members. Id. The majority's
requirement, however, is in accord with the cases upon which the Fiori court relied. See
Jobes, 529 A.2d at 448 (requiring certification from "at least two independent physicians
knowledgeable in neurology" and certification from the patient's attending physician);
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299 (requiring that the patient's attending physician
and two additional consulting physicians concur to ensure that the diagnosis is accurate).
105. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
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Third, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not consider the
issue of the irreversibility of the surrogate's decision. As the
United States Supreme Court recognized, "[a]n erroneous deci-
sion not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo,"
whereas "[an erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction." 10 6 The fatal
consequence of a mistake in judgment or a decision based on
improper motives alone is sufficient to warrant judicial
intervention.
Finally, to require court intervention does not necessarily
mean that the process will take so long that the patient will prob-
ably die before the court makes its determination, nor does it
mean that the process must burden the patient's family. Such a
determination by the court could be treated like an emergency
injunction. The court could hold an emergency hearing and hear
testimony from the interested parties to ensure only that: (1) the
proper relationship exists between the surrogate and the patient;
(2) the surrogate is capable of ascertaining and effectuating the
patients wishes; and (3) the surrogate is not acting from
improper motives. Unfortunately, as the law now stands in
Pennsylvania based on Fiori, the life-sustaining treatment of the
incompetent patient can be refused or discontinued by a surro-
gate who has undetected improper motives just as it would be if
the surrogate made the decision from proper motives. All the
surrogate has to do is follow the procedure. If the surrogate with
improper motives is lucky enough to proceed undetected, he or
she will gather her ill-gotten gain when the patient dies.10 7
By not addressing these critical issues, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not make them disappear. Instead, these
critical issues may very well stay unrecognized in the Common-
wealth while their consequences continue to affect the lives of
patients who cannot make this life or death health care decision
for themselves.
V. THE LEGIsLATIVE RESPONSE: SURROGATE HEALTH
CARE STATUTES
Although Pennsylvania has yet to enact legislation setting
forth a procedure for a surrogate to follow when making a health
care decision on behalf of another, at least eighteen states and
106. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
107. On the other hand, keeping a patient alive may also profit a surrogate. A sur-
rogate who, for example, is the beneficiary of a trust that terminates at the death of the
patient-settlor would stand to lose if the patient dies. Thus, the surrogate may decide to
continue life-sustaining treatment in order not to lose income from the trust.
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the District of Columbia have passed legislation governing the
issue of surrogate health care decision making. 0 The following
is a survey of these nineteen jurisdictions.
All nineteen of the jurisdictions have provided by statute a list
of persons who may act as a surrogate for an incompetent
patient."°9 Those persons authorized by statute to make a health
care decision (if no guardian has been appointed) generally
include the patient's spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling,
grandparent and/or adult grandchild.1 0 Several jurisdictions
additionally provide that either a competent relative of the
patient or the patient's nearest living relative may make the
health care decision."' Four states, including Arizona, Idaho,
Oregon and South Carolina also allow the attending physician to
make the decision if no other person on the list can be located."
2
108. The following jurisdictions have enacted health care consent statutes: Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia
and the District of Columbia.
109. See AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231A (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-18.5-103(3) (Supp. 1996); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-571(a) (West Supp.; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-2210(a)(1)-(6) (1989 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(a)-(g)
(West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a) (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4303(a)-(c) (1993); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 40/25(a) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
36-1-5(a) (Michie 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(b)-(c) (West. Supp. 1996);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GENERAL § 5-605(aX2)-(4) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5A-C
(Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2965-2 (McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.635(2)(a)-(g) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12C-3 (Michie 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-11072(b) (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-
7(a) (1995).
110. See supra note 109 for citations to the relevant state statutes. The statutes list
the persons in order of priority. See id.
111. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(a)(6) (1989 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.401(f) (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-4303(b) (1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 5-805(bX8) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.L § 5-605(a)(3); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.635(g) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30A(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A(6) (Michie 1994). Eleven states additionally list a
friend, competent adult or other adult who has exhibited care or concern for the patient
as possible surrogates. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231A-6 (West Supp. 1996); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(3) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(g) (West Supp. 1997);
IDAHO CODE § 39-4303(b) (1993); 75 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 40/25(a)(7) (West 1992); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(c) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 5-605(aX3) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5C (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW § 2965-2(vi) (McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(g) (Supp. 1995); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30B-7(a)(7) (1995). Finally, Arizona includes "domestic partner" as a possible
surrogate, and the District of Columbia and Indiana allow a religious superior to act as
surrogate if the incompetent patient is a member of a religious order. See Aiuz. REV.
STAT. ANN § 36-3231A4 (West Supp. 1996) D.C. CODE ANN § 21-2210(a)(5A) (Supp. 1996);
IND. CODE § 16-36-1-5(aX3) (Michie 1993).
112. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231B (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4303(c) (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(3) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-40(A)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
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Finally, Connecticut alone authorizes only the incompetent
patient's attending physician to make the health care decision to
terminate life-sustaining treatment.113
Not all of the jurisdictions with statutes governing surrogate
decision making permit the surrogate to withhold life-sustaining
treatment from the patient. Six states, Arizona, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, New York and South Dakota, do not empower a surro-
gate to withdraw a patient's life-prolonging or life-sustaining
procedures.1 4  The following ten states, however, expressly
include the power to withhold a patient's life-sustaining proce-
dures within the consent powers of the surrogate: Colorado, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Virginia and West Virginia. 1 5  The statutes of the remaining
jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Georgia and South Caro-
lina, are silent on the issue." 6
Twelve jurisdictions identify standards for a surrogate to fol-
low in making the decision to accept, refuse or terminate life-
113. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a) (West Supp. 1996). If the patient's wishes
have not been expressed in a living will, Connecticut requires the attending physician to
consider statements made by the patient to his or her attending physician, health care
agent, next of kin, legal guardian or conservator. Id.
114. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231D (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.305(1) (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-4509(1) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-
4-13(c) (Michie 1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2965 (McKinney 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 34-12D-1(7), -6 (Michie 1994). Four of the states require the patient to have exe-
cuted a living will declaration or to have appointed a surrogate in writing prior to having
become incompetent before life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305(1) (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-4509(1) (1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13(c) (Michie 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-12D-1(7), -6 (Michie
1994). Arizona expressly prohibits the surrogate from withdrawing "the artificial admin-
istration of food or fluid" unless the surrogate is the patient's agent or guardian. ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231D (West Supp. 1996). Finally, New York specifically limits the
surrogate's power to "do not resuscitate" orders. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2965 (McKin-
ney 1993).
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(6) (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
571(a) (West Supp. 1996); 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 40/25(a) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(b)(2)
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1A (Michie Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(1) to
(4) (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE
AaN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-7 (1995).
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). Nonetheless, arguments could be
made that decisionmaking powers of a surrogate in the District of Columbia and Georgia
include the withholding of life-sustaining measures. Although the District of Columbia
statute sets forth a surrogate's limitations, it does not include withholding life-prolonging
treatment. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2211. The "Consent for Surgical or Medical Treatment"
chapter in the Georgia code provides that the provisions of the chapter are to be "liberally
construed." GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6(a). The definition of "health care" in the South Caro-
lina statute, however, does provide that consent may be given only to treat "human dis-
ease, ailment, defect, abnormality or complaint." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(1).
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sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient.11
7
Eleven of these jurisdictions direct the surrogate to follow the
patient's wishes, if known, or otherwise to make a decision that
is in the best interest of the patient."' Four of these jurisdic-
tions, including Indiana, South Carolina, South Dakota and
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, do not provide fur-
ther explanation to guide the surrogate."19 Six states, however,
including Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, New York and
Virginia, do provide some guidelines for the surrogate to follow in
determining either the wishes or the best interests of the
patient. 20 Although the Arizona statute directs a surrogate to
follow the wishes of the patient, it fails to provide the surrogate
with additional guidance when the patient's wishes are not
known.' 2' Of all the jurisdictions, only two do not identify a spe-
cific standard, but instead give the surrogate guidance that
resembles the substituted judgment standard. 22 Only one state
117. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231A (West Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2210(b) (1989); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/20(b)(1) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-
5(d) (Michie 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(f) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(cXl) & (2) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(F) (Michie
Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2965(3) (McKinney 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-
30(F) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-12C-3 (Michie 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-8(b) (1995).
118. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(b) (1989); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 40/20(bXl)
(1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-5(d) (Michie 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-
805(f) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(1) & (2) (1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(F) (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2965(3) (McKin-
ney 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFID LAWS
§ 34-12C-3 (Michie 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-
30B-8(b) (1995).
119. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(b) (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-5(d) (Michie
1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODInED LAws § 34-
12C-3 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-8(b) (1995).
120. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/20(bXl) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 5-805(f) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(cXl) & (2)
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(F) (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2965(3) (McKinney 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994). Of these states,
Illinois, Maine and New Mexico provide guidance for determining the patient's best inter-
ests, while Maryland, New York and Virginia provide guidance for determining the
patient's wishes. See 755 ILL. Com:. STAT. ANN. 40/20(b)(1) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(f) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(1) &
(2) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(F) (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2965(3) (McKinney 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994).
121. Aiu. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231A (West Supp. 1996).
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(a) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(b)
(1996). For example, the Georgia code provides:
Any person authorized and empowered to consent under subsection (a) of this Code
section shall, after being informed of the provisions of this Code section, act in good
faith to consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures which the patient
would have wanted had the patient understood the circumstances under which
such treatment or procedures are provided.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(b) (1996).
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statute requires the substituted judgment of the surrogate to be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 123 At least three
states, however, expressly provide that decisions to withhold life-
sustaining procedures be made without judicial intervention.1"
Finally, with the exception of two states, all of the surveyed
jurisdictions specify the number of physicians required to deter-
mine whether a patient lacks the capacity to give informed con-
sent to the decision to accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining
treatment.125 The majority of these jurisdictions (nine states and
the District of Columbia) require two physicians to certify that
the patient lacks capacity. 2 6 Seven states require only one phy-
sician to make the determination, 27 and of these states, Connect-
123. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(3) (West Supp. 1997). Florida requires that the sur-
rogate's decision to "withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient
would have chosen had the patient been competent." Id.
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(g) (West Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN
§ 24-7A-5G (Michie Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-7(c) (1995).
125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(1) (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
571(a) (West Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2204(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. ALNN. §
765.204(2) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(c) (1996); 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. 40/20(c) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-3-5 (Michie 1993); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(a)(1)
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-11 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2963(2) (McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.640 (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-12C-2(4) (Michie 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(2) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A
(Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-6 (1995).
126. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2204(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.204(2) (West
Supp. 1997); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 40/20(c) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN § 16-36-3-5
(Michie 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(aXl) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
7A-11 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2963(2) (McKinney 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(2) (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-6 (1995). Of these states, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, New York, Utah and West Virginia require that one of the two
licensed physicians be the patient's attending physician. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.204(2)
(West Supp. 1997); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 40/20(c) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN § 16-
36-3-5 (Michie 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(a)(1) (1994); N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAw § 2963(2) (McKinney 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(2) (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-6 (1995). Maryland, however, does not require a
second physician to concur if the patient is "unconscious or unable to communicate by any
means...." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(a)(2). South Carolina merely requires
two licensed physicians, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996), and New
Mexico requires one of the licensed physicians to be the patient's primary physician.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-11 (Michie Supp. 1994). Interestingly, the District of Columbia
requires one of the two physicians to be a psychiatrist. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2204(a)
(1989).
127. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(1) (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-571(a) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(c) (1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.640 (Supp. 1995); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws § 34-12C-2(4) (Michie 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994). Of
these states, Colorado, Connecticut, Oregon, South Dakota and Virginia require the
patient's attending physician to make the determination, while Maine requires the
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icut, Oregon and Utah only require the physician to determine
whether a patient is either in a permanent vegetative state or is
permanently unconscious, rather than whether the patient is
incapable of giving informed consent. 12 Oregon, however, per-
mits surrogate decision making only when the patient's attend-
ing physician determines that the patient is in an advanced
stage of a terminal illness and is incapable of communicating or
ingesting food or water.
129
As noted by the preceding survey, at least nineteen jurisdic-
tions have specifically passed legislation detailing the procedures
to be followed when a surrogate makes a health care decision on
behalf of an incompetent patient. Determining the procedures to
be followed is of paramount importance because, as the United
States Supreme Court recognized in Cruzan, modern medical
advances have provided the medical profession with the capacity
to sustain life "well past the point where natural forces would
have brought certain death in earlier times" and, as a result,
have caused a rapid growth in cases involving the right of an
individual to refuse life-sustaining procedures. 130
The Pennsylvania Legislature should determine the extent of
the right of self-determination and the procedures to be followed
in exercising this right since it is the branch of government with
the resources to investigate the issues and create procedures for
the many aspects of surrogate health care decision making.' 3 '
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Illinois suggested, the legisla-
ture is elected by the people to represent them and therefore, is
best suited for determining social policy.132 Therefore, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature should have followed the lead of its eighteen
sister states and the District of Columbia and enacted proce-
dures to be followed in the exercise of such an important right.
As a result of the Pennsylvania Legislature's failure to pass
legislation governing surrogate health care decision making, the
patient's primary physician, and Georgia a licensed physician. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
18.5-103(1) (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a) (West Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(c) (1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (West Supp. 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.640 (Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 34-12C-2(4) (Michie 1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986A (Michie 1994).
128. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(a) (West. Supp. 1996) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1107(a) (Supp. 1996).
129. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.640 (Supp. 1995).
130. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
131. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming 741 P.2d 674, 692 (Ariz. 1987) (reason-
ing that the legislature should resolve this important issue because "[o]nly the Legisla-
ture has the resources necessary to gather and synthesize the vast quantities of
information needed to formulate guidelines that will best accommodate the rights and
interests of the many individuals and institutions involved in these tragic situations").
132. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ill. 1989).
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important issue presented in Fiori could only be resolved by a
court. Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overstepped
its authority in deciding this important issue is important.
The decision to extend the right of self-determination to incom-
petent adult patients should not be considered an act of judicial
legislation for two reasons. First, although the Pennsylvania
Legislature failed to include any provisions in the Advance
Directive for Health Care Act 13 3 (the "statute") that would
resolve the issue of surrogate decision making in situations
where a PVS patient failed to execute an advance directive for
health care prior to becoming incompetent, the text of the statute
suggests that the legislature was aware such a situation could
arise. The Pennsylvania Legislature specifically intended the
statute to "create no presumption concerning the intent of any
person who has not executed a declaration to consent to the use
or withholding of life-sustaining procedures in the event of a ter-
minal condition or a state of permanent unconsciousness."134
The statute further provides that a patient's failure to execute an
advance directive for health care does not "impair or supersede
any existing rights.., not addressed." 13 5 Thus, the Pennsylvania
Legislature invited the court to address the issue and left the
door open for the supreme court to recognize the right of a PVS
patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment under the common
law of Pennsylvania.
Second, judicial legislation occurs when a court creates new
principles of law, not when a court simply applies existing princi-
ples to cases before it. 13 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did
not create a new principle of law in Fiori, but instead applied the
133. The Pennsylvania Advance Directive for Health Care Act (the "Act") became
effective on April 16, 1992. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5401-5416 (Supp. 1996). The Act pro-
vides that "[a]n individual of sound mind.. . may execute... a declaration governing the
initiation, continuation, withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment." Id.
§ 5404. The Act, however, does not provide for situations where an individual, who was
once competent but is now incompetent, left no advance directive.
134. Id. § 5402(b).
135. Id. § 5412.
136. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 125 A.2d 644, 646 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956)
(quoting Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1890)). In a law review article written before Justice Brandeis was appointed to the
United States Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel Warren, dis-
tinguished between judge-made law and judicial legislation:
The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not judicial legisla-
tion. To call it such is to assert that the existing body of law consists practically of
the statutes and decided cases, and to deny that the principles (of which these
cases are ordinarily said to be evidence) exist at all. It is not the application of an
existing principal to new cases, but the introduction of a new principle, which is
properly termed judicial legislation.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 213
n.1 (1890).
Vol. 35:849876
Surrogate Health Care Decision Making
existing common law principle of the right to self-determination
to a situation relevant to the lives of many individuals. 3 7 Thus,
the Fiori court had the authority to decide the important issue of
whether a patient in a permanent vegetative state has the right
to self-determine whether to accept, refuse, or terminate life-sus-
taining treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly had the authority in
Fiori to decide the issues involved in terminating the life-sus-
taining treatment of a patient in a permanent vegetative state.
The legislature invited the court to address the issue both by not
addressing the issue itself and by preserving common law rights
not addressed by the Advance Directive for Health Care Act. The
court in Fiori merely took the legislature up on its offer and
grounded the right to accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining
treatment on the common law doctrine of informed consent. The
remainder of the supreme court's decision in Fiori, however, is
not so easily analyzed.
The legal aspects of the right of a surrogate to make a decision
regarding life-sustaining measures on behalf of a incompetent
patient are fraught with complicated issues. The most important
of these issues is the role that the federal Constitution plays in
protecting the right to refuse or terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment. Although the United States Constitution, via the right to
privacy, prevents governmental interference into important deci-
sions made within the family relationship, the United States
Supreme Court has never held that the right to privacy includes
health care decisions made by a surrogate on behalf of an incom-
petent patient. Instead, the United States Supreme Court has
strongly implied that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a competent patient's interest in refusing
life-sustaining treatment. Within this sphere, however, the
Supreme Court has also strongly implied that the Due Process
Clause protects a state's interest in life as well, and, conse-
137. Even if the Fiori decision is considered to be an act of judicial legislation, the
decision may be justified because of the societal need to have this important issue
resolved:
But even the fact that a certain decision would involve judicial legislation should
not be taken as conclusive against the propriety of making it. This power has been
constantly exercised by our judges, when applying to a new subject principles of
private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience. Indeed, the elasticity of our
law, its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for growth, which has enabled
it to meet the wants of an ever changing society and to apply immediate relief for
every recognized wrong, have been its greatest boast.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 136.
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quently, the state may protect an incompetent patient's interest
in life by requiring a surrogate exercising this right on behalf of
another to meet a heightened evidentiary standard. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, however, rejected a heightened scru-
tiny standard in Fiori when it determined that it was unduly
restrictive. Although the court properly concluded that the sub-
stituted judgment standard should be followed by a close family
member when acting as surrogate for an incompetent patient,
the court erroneously rejected the appropriate applicability of the
clear and convincing standard to situations where someone other
than a close family member, such as the patient's physician or a
friend, may make the life or death decision. When the surrogate
is not a close family member, the court should require a higher
evidentiary burden to ensure the existence of a sufficient rela-
tionship between the patient and surrogate and sufficient facts
upon which a surrogate may base his or her opinion as to the
patient's wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment.
By taking a hands-off position with respect to judicial scrutiny
of a surrogate's decision, the court failed to recognize and
address at least other two important issues: the motives of the
surrogate and the irreversibility of a decision to terminate or
refuse life-sustaining treatment. The Fiori court should have
recognized the importance of the judiciary's role under the lib-
erty interest of the Due Process Clause. The state's interest in
protecting an incompetent patient's interest in life imposes on
the court a duty to ensure that the surrogate is not motivated by
greed or other improper motives because any decision to refuse
or discontinue life-sustaining treatment cannot be later
corrected.
Finally, when balancing the rights of the individual against
the four competing state interests, the Fiori court failed to suffi-
ciently explain the state interests and the reasons why they did
not prevail in that case. Instead, the court mechanically applied
the "four-state-interests" test and did not present a thoughtful
analysis that would assist interested parties in future situations
where patients are not capable of making this life or death deci-
sion for themselves.
In summary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did resolve a
few important issues in Fiori. For example, where a close family
member is making the same decision as to life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment that the patient would have made, the court's opin-
ion sufficiently defines the right, the legal standard to be met and
the procedure to be followed by the family member in determin-
ing whether to accept, refuse or terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment. The court, however, failed to address or even recognize the
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other previously noted important issues that could realistically
arise in future situations similar to Fiori's. As a result, when the
issues not addressed in Fiori are again presented to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, the court's obligation will be to provide
the citizens of Pennsylvania with a more thorough analysis of the
issues and reasons for its decision.
Christine H. Nooning

